Having won by a small margin, the MB could not very well contest the outcome, and all the other candidates displayed great caution. But the days that followed the election provided disturbing indications. Curious coalitions, unexpected declarations by one candidate or another created a sense, among the people, of being caught in a difficult and frustrating choice. One candidate directly affiliated with the former regime, and another representing an organization whose message had been muddled and contradictory, an organization that surely represented one third of popular opinion, but that had also agreed to deal with the military out of concern first and foremost for its own political fortunes. Encouraged and perhaps hypnotized by the Turkish and Tunisian examples, the MB may well have believed that their time had come.
But it is impossible to overlook the succession of strategic and tactical errors and political failings that are likely to have a high cost, not only for the organization, but also for the entire country and its future. Management of diversity of opinion internally; the newly-created party’s rigid membership regulations; the absence of openness to the youth; the expulsion of dissenting voices; the decision to participate in the presidential election; relations with the military, etc.: all these factors raise serious and fundamental questions about the organization’s orientations and objectives. In the aftermath of the first round, everything tends to indicate that the MB may well have functioned as a cat’s paw for the military. A victory for Ahmad Shafiq is now probable, given the prevailing confusion—and the manipulative skills of the former regime. The life sentence handed down to Mubarak and the acquittal of his sons and the other co-accused must be interpreted symbolically. Far from favoring the MB, it revealed the SCAF as a powerful behind-the-scenes presence. In Egypt’s emerging new order, certain people are to be protected and others simply relocated; but much of the former regime’s practices will persist.
The Tunisian example (and the Turkish precedent), as well as the aspiration for recognition (after sixty long years of opposition and underground existence), seems to have misled the leaders of the organization and the party that, after the first round, finds itself in first place and yet trapped. Did the military simply use them to legitimize the transition to a military-democratic system far less transparent than it appears at first glance? The cost in terms of credibility has been high. Should the MB win the election, which would be surprising, it would find itself in a near-untenable position, facing political, social and economic obstacles that it would find daunting to overcome. Its situation is in no way comparable to Turkey’s: the MB might well chose to integrate itself into the dominant capitalist economy by signaling its readiness to deal with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, but Egypt’s economy is far weaker than Turkey’s, and its place in the Middle East is far more sensitive, particularly with regard to the Israel-Palestine conflict. The MB may well win the presidential election, but everything indicates that a broader victory is most likely to elude it.
The situation in Egypt is serious. As the second round approaches the two possible scenarios seem far removed the earlier promise of stability and social peace. Should Ahmad Shafiq be returned to power, it is certain that many people will take to the streets, and that this time, the military will not play the role of passive spectator that it did in early 2011, invoking this time the democratic legitimacy derived from the ballot box. Let us hope that the people, and particularly the young people, will remain active without falling into the trap of violence. The Egyptian spring is far behind us now; the revolution may be just beginning—or it may have been aborted…if it ever truly existed.
